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PUBLICATION INFORMATION:
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2020, VOL 114 NO. 1 (1-50)

THE PROOF IS IN THE PROCESS:
SELF-REPORTING UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
By Cosette D. Creamer * and Beth A. Simmons **
ABSTRACT
Recent research has shown that state reporting to human rights monitoring bodies is
associated with improvements in rights practices, calling into question earlier claims that selfreporting is inconsequential. Yet little work has been done to explore the theoretical mechanisms
that plausibly account for this association. This Article systematically documents—across treaties,
countries, and years—four mechanisms through which reporting can contribute to human rights
improvements: elite socialization, learning and capacity building, domestic mobilization, and law
development. These mechanisms have implications for the future of human rights treaty
monitoring.
Over the past fifty years, the number of international human rights codified in treaty form
has exploded. There are now nine core multilateral human rights agreements, each with their own
monitoring body, and several optional protocols. 1 This treaty regime covers a range of rights for
all persons, from civil and political to economic, social, and cultural rights. Dedicated treaties aim
to eliminate discrimination against racial minorities and women, and to protect the rights of
children, migrants, and the disabled. Every country has committed itself to at least one of these
core treaties, and most have ratified several.
The treaties are administered by reviewing bodies that, among other functions, receive
reports from the member states on their human rights practices. Recent research has shown that
reporting states improve their rights practices when they engage in ongoing dialogue with these
treaty bodies, throwing into question earlier impressions that self-reporting is inconsequential. This
improvement occurs even though states that report are initially no better at respecting human rights
than those that do not. 2
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To be sure, the human rights treaty-body system has faced many challenges. Reform
discussions have recurred since its inception. 3 Commentary has grown more urgent since the early
2000s, as the system has expanded in size, scope, and membership. In 2009, the UN high
commissioner for human rights initiated a process to strengthen the treaty bodies, recognizing that
chronic under-resourcing, backlog, lack of engagement, and complexity of working methods were
compromising the system. After consultations with states parties, experts, and civil society, the
high commissioner presented a report to the General Assembly proposing measures to reinforce
the system. 4 Following two years of difficult negotiations among member states, the General
Assembly adopted a resolution to do so. 5 This resulted in measures aimed to enhance the treaty
bodies’ capacity to protect human rights. In 2020 the General Assembly will review these
measures’ effectiveness and consider additional actions to further improve the system.
Given these upcoming reform discussions, it is important to understand the nature and
quality of the self-reporting process and consider evidence-based recommendations for its
improvement. Over the past decade, our understanding of international treaties’ effects on state
behavior and human rights outcomes has grown significantly, 6 but few studies investigate
systematically how self-reporting affects treaty implementation and ultimately domestic laws and
practices. The most rigorous evidence to date establishes a plausible connection between the
cumulative effects of participating in the reporting process and improved human rights outcomes.
Recent research shows that the more frequently states participate in the reporting process, the better
they perform on relevant indicators of rights outcomes. 7 In particular, repeated and cumulative
dialogues with treaty bodies have contributed to lower levels of discrimination against women and
physical integrity rights violations. Employing a range of statistical techniques, these studies help
establish a causal connection between the fact of iterated reporting and improved rights practices
and gesture toward mechanisms of public attention and political mobilization as potential
explanations for this connection. However, research has yet to explore the range of theoretical
mechanisms that plausibly account for the link between reporting and rights improvements. In
short, the process connecting periodic review by the treaty bodies and human rights improvements
remains opaque.
This Article demonstrates that certain features of the process of self-reporting to human
rights treaty bodies can account for the positive relationship between the act of reporting and
UN GAOR, 44th Sess. Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including
Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/44/668 (Nov. 8, 1989).
4
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body
System, UN Doc. A/66/860 (2012).
5
UN GAOR, 68th Sess., Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 9 April 2014, Strengthening and
Enhancing the Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Treaty Body System, UN Doc. A/RES/68/268 (Apr. 21,
2014).
6
KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2017);
BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009);
Christopher J. Fariss, The Changing Standard of Accountability and the Positive Relationship Between Human
Rights Treaty Ratification and Compliance, 48 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 239 (2018); Kevin L. Cope & Cosette D. Creamer,
Disaggregating the Human Rights Treaty Regime, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. (2016); Xinyuan Dai, The Conditional Effects
of International Human Rights Institutions, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 569 (2014). Some researchers argue that international
treaties have contributed little to improved rights enjoyment, citing weak enforcement. Oona Hathaway, Do Human
Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN
RIGHTS A REALITY (2013).
7
Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women’s Rights, supra note 2; Creamer &
Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2.
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positive human rights outcomes reported in earlier research. In particular, this Article
systematically documents—across treaties, countries, and years—four mechanisms that theory and
evidence suggest contribute to human rights improvements: elite socialization, learning and
capacity building, domestic mobilization, and law development. We show that reports are
becoming more thorough, increasingly candid, and more relevant to treaty obligations. More states
are developing the capacity to collect, systematize, and analyze information—and more are willing
to include such information in their reports—than in the past. Most importantly, the report-andreview process seeps into domestic politics, as reflected in the growth and localization of civil
society participation (shadow reporting) and local media publicity. In other words, what is
discussed in Geneva does not stay in Geneva. It spills over into domestic debates, adding fuel to
mobilization and prompting demands for implementation. The work of the treaty bodies is also
increasingly relevant to and informs law development at the regional level.
This Article’s claims are limited in two respects. First, it should be obvious that rights
practices are shaped by many complex influences. No monocausal account of law—much less
reporting under international treaty regimes—can fully determine actual rights protections and
violations. The processes documented in this Article exist synergistically with a multitude of other
influences; they do not operate in social, political, or legal isolation. Self-reporting matters because
bureaucracies can learn, because the media reports, because groups mobilize, and because expert
decisions and views contribute to law development. A host of other individuals and institutions—
from special rapporteurs to local politicians—play important roles as well. The mechanisms
discussed here benefit from, amplify, and empower these entities. Second, while the Article
demonstrates that the reporting process accords with conditions that theoretically facilitate positive
outcomes, causal tests for each mechanism are not presented here. Rather, we offer empirically
supported reasons for taking seriously established causal claims between the act of self-reporting
and positive human rights outcomes.
This Article first demonstrates in Part I that self-reporting is a crucial and pervasive
“enforcement” device in both domestic and international law. Part II describes the history and
evolution of the contemporary human rights self-reporting regime. Part III links self-reporting and
review to theories of elite socialization, learning and capacity building, political mobilization, and
law development. The conclusion in Part IV is cautiously optimistic. It entertains critiques,
including potential problems of reporting fatigue and meaningless bureaucratic ritualization. It also
offers policy recommendations based on theory and evidence. Far from conceding defeat, reforms
should continue to focus on making the report-and-review process streamlined, accessible, and
actionable.
I. SELF-REPORTING AND LAW “ENFORCEMENT”
Self-reporting has become a common tool of regulatory compliance at all levels of
governance. At the national level, it is often considered the best—and sometimes the only—way
to elicit information needed to enforce the law. From the U.S. Defense Department’s Contractor
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Disclosure Program 8 to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 9 to the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 10 American regulators routinely use self-reporting to enhance
regulatory compliance and encourage the development of self-policing capacity among firms.
Self-reporting is also central to regional regulatory enforcement. The European Union
depends on information provided by national administrations and employs “soft” tools such as
regulatory transparency to encourage compliance with European policies. 11 The EU’s Open
Method of Coordination relies on iterative national reports to assess regulatory progress, provide
peer review, exchange best practices, and occasionally issue recommendations on how best to
achieve common regulatory goals. 12 A range of actors—national agencies, ministry officials,
parliamentarians, civil society, and the media—deploy information disclosed during this process
to set national policy agendas and press for reforms. 13
Critics debate self-reporting systems’ effectiveness in reducing law violations, but some
domestic evidence suggests it is a useful component in a broader regulatory framework. Selfreporting systems have contributed to pollution abatement 14 by reducing the costs of monitoring,15
encouraging remediation (or correction) of violations, 16 and generally contributing to a norm of
“self-policing.” 17 Firms’ ability and willingness to self-police has long been an important aspect
of deterrence and compliance in a range of regulatory arenas. 18
These systems also have well-known weaknesses. Often, actors resist self-reporting,
especially when such requirements are new and perceived as burdensome. One particularly
disparaged example is Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 19 which required companies to
disclose annually whether they had obtained certain minerals from mines controlled by armed
groups in the Congo. Few reporting requirements have been so severely denounced as costly and
Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure Program, in DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (USAM), TITLE 9: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL (CRM), § 931, at
http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-931-department-defense-voluntary-disclosure-program.
9
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) “encourages self-reports of possible violations, and in
many cases, self-reported violations have resulted in closure of the matter without sanctions.” See FERC, Self Reports,
at http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/self-reports.asp.
10
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) relies on “several self-disclosure processes that can be used to report
potential fraud in Department of Health and Human Services (HSS) Programs.” See OIG, Self-Disclosure Information,
at http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/self-disclosure-info.
11
Åse Gornitzka & Ulf Sverdrup, Access of Experts: Information and EU Decision-Making, 34 W. EUR. POL. 48
(2011).
12
See CHANGING EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE REGIMES: THE INFLUENCE OF THE OPEN METHOD OF
COORDINATION ON NATIONAL REFORMS (Martin Heidenreich & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2009).
13
Rik de Ruiter, Full Disclosure? The Open Method of Coordination, Parliamentary Debates and Media
Coverage, 14 EUR. UNION POL. 95 (2013); Eva G. Heidbreder, Governance in the European Union: A Policy Analysis
of the Attempts to Raise Legitimacy Through Civil Society Participation, 17 J. COMP. POL’Y ANALYSIS 359 (2015).
14
See John Livernois & C. J. McKenna, Truth or Consequences: Enforcing Pollution Standards with SelfReporting, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 415 (1999); CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL, WINSTON HARRINGTON & WILLIAM J. VAUGHN,
ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (2011); Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics:
A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 675 (1992).
15
Arun S. Malik, Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution, 24 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 241 (1993).
16
Robert Innes, Remediation and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement, 72 J. PUB. ECON. 379 (1999).
17
Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate
Effective Self-Policing?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 609 (2011).
18
Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994).
19
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124, § 929-Z, 124 Stat.
1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
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ineffective. When some of the initial reports became available for review and analysis, they made
for quite uninformative reading, with companies typically claiming they could not determine who
controlled the mines from which they sourced minerals. 20
Yet even this much-maligned reporting requirement spawned potentially interesting
dynamics. Some companies began to investigate the provenance of their mineral inputs, which
incentivized implementation of firm governance models that increased the feasibility of tracing
mineral sourcing. Models of supply chain due diligence were adopted to replace individual firms’
uninformative go-it-alone reports. 21 Third-party auditors developed a capacity to certify certain
sources as “conflict free.” While early returns from the reporting were not encouraging, evenhanded analysts noted new reputational pressures to scrutinize supply chains and concluded that
the system should be improved rather than scrapped. 22 More importantly, firms were innovating
even as they began—often reluctantly—the task of self-reporting. Some optimistic advocates
attributed a decline in rebel mining in the Congo to greater attention by corporations and
consumers to sourcing. 23
Domestic self-reporting systems for private or commercial actors, as well as regional
European ones for governments, differ in an important respect from most international systems:
they are usually backed by some ability to punish violators if detected. International regimes have
very limited ability to punish delinquent non-reporters. 24 Instead, they must rely on moral suasion
and peer pressure to encourage report submission. Governments might then face political pressure
and administrators may even experience “lie aversion,” 25 which creates subtle pressures to be
honest and thorough. 26
International law depends on self-reporting even more than domestic or regional legal
systems do. International cooperation is inconceivable—or at least very inefficient—without the
ability to collect and share credible information. 27 Such information makes it theoretically possible
Yong H. Kim & Gerald F. Davis, Challenges for Global Supply Chain Sustainability: Evidence from Conflict
Minerals Reports, 59 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1896 (2016) (finding that the more decentralized and dispersed the vertical
supply chains, the less likely firms were to certify that their supplies were “conflict free”).
21
Stephane Timmer & Lutz Kaufmann, Conflict Minerals Traceability – a Fuzzy Set Analysis, 47 INT’L J.
PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS MGMT. 344 (2017); Hannes Hofmann, Martin C. Schleper & Constantin Blome,
Conflict Minerals and Supply Chain Due Diligence: An Exploratory Study of Multi-tier Supply Chains, 147 J. BUS.
ETHICS 115 (2108) (finding that a supply-chain wide management and accountability approach renders traceability
more feasible than a firm-by-firm approach).
22
Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129 (2016). See also Jomo Sankara,
Deborah L. Lindberg & Khalid A. Razaki, Conflict Minerals Disclosures: Reporting Requirements and Implications
for Auditing, 10 CURRENT ISSUES IN AUDITING A1 (2016) (noting the increase in auditing triggered by reputational
pressures).
23
The Enough Project, Progress and Challenges on Conflict Minerals: Facts on Dodd-Frank 1502, at
https://enoughproject.org/special-topics/progress-and-challenges-conflict-minerals-facts-dodd-frank-1502.
24
Differential punishments are useful if actors can expect to escape harsher punishments or more intensive
scrutiny by reporting than if wrongs are discovered independently. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal
Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583 (1994).
25
Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan, Designing Self-Reporting Regimes to Encourage Truth Telling: An
Experimental Study, 94 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 90 (2013).
26
This finding is consistent with findings in the context of international human rights regimes. See Cosette D.
Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights: Quality of Participation in the Convention Against
Torture, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 579 (2015) (finding that the quality of reporting to the Committee Against Torture has
improved overtime for those states that submit reports).
27
Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade:
The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POLIT. 1 (1990); ROBERT O. KEOHANE,
AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
20
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for states to avoid costly conflict 28 and realize joint gains that would otherwise be difficult to
achieve given that “political market failures” are rife internationally. 29
In fact, self-reporting requirements are the most common form of “enforcement” in
international law and institutions.30 Barbara Koremenos recently found that a little over half of a
random sample of treaties deposited with the United Nations rely on self-monitoring, third-party
surveillance, or a combination of both. 31 In the area of arms control, some eighty-five of 227
agreements provide for self-reporting as the most intrusive form of monitoring. 32 When the stakes
are high, self-reporting is often supplemented with verification by an international body, peer
inspections, and/or unilateral or external monitoring. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention,
for instance, states parties must initially declare stocks of chemical weapons and subsequent annual
progress made toward their destruction. 33 The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons verifies these declarations through onsite inspection. States parties may also request a
“challenge inspection” of any other state party’s facilities. Self-reporting thus plays a central role
in arms control, even as verification provisions have increased and external monitoring has become
denser.
Other areas of international law rely on self-reporting systems with weaker forms of
delegated monitoring, while allowing for additional input from civil society, peer governments,
and international bureaucracies. A good example is trade enforcement, which relies on a system
of fire alarms rather than police patrols. 34 With private firms highly incentivized to report and
litigate instances of noncompliance, 35 information is produced largely through dispute
settlement. 36 However, the World Trade Organization (WTO) also collects information through
regular “notifications” by governments regarding specific measures, policies, or laws. Regular
reporting and review of trade policies also occurs through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism,
with input provided by the reviewed state and the Organization’s bureaucracy, followed by
questioning by peer governments within a public forum. 37 In this case, the purpose is expressly
not to enforce WTO law but rather to facilitate trade by providing transparency on members’

28
James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 INT’L ORG. 379 (1995); Michaela Mattes & Burcu
Savun, Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 511 (2010);
DAN LINDLEY, PROMOTING PEACE WITH INFORMATION: TRANSPARENCY AS A TOOL OF SECURITY REGIME (2007);
POWER AND CONFLICT IN THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY (Bernard I. Finel & Kristin M. Lord eds., 2002).
29
Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., 1983).
30
Ann Florini, The Evolution of International Norms, 40 INT’L STUD. Q. 363, 381 (1996).
31
BARBARA KOREMENOS, THE CONTINENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 261–62 (2016).
32
Jane Vaynman, Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation Between Adversaries,
ch.
3
(July
2014)
(unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation,
Harvard
University),
available
at
https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/13070027.
33
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction, Art. IX.2, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 UNTS 45; 32 ILM 800 (1993).
34
Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus
Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
35
Xinyuan Dai, Information Systems in Treaty Regimes, 54 WORLD POL. 405 (2002).
36
See, e.g., James McCall Smith, The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional
Trade Pacts, 54 INT’L ORG. 137 (2000).
37
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), Art. III & Annex III:A(ii), THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 UNTS 154,
33 ILM 1144 (1994.
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policies and practices. 38 While an innovation in monitoring multilateral trade agreements,
practically nothing is known about its consequences.
Self-reporting is also a central pillar in international environmental agreements. Some, like
the G20 Fossil Fuel Subsidy Agreement, depend almost exclusively on information from adhering
states. 39 In many instances, self-reporting complements other forms of information gathering
thought to be critical to transparency and ultimately compliance. For example, various “systems
for implementation review” exist in international environmental agreements, “through which the
parties share information, compare activities, review performance, handle noncompliance, and
adjust commitments.” 40 While existing research does not theorize how state-generated self-reports
can affect behavior, 41 the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is likely a critical
element. Many observers note the similarity between the watchdog role that NGOs play in
supplementing state reporting in environmental and human rights implementation processes. 42
Monitoring provisions are also common in human rights agreements. In Koremenos’s
random sample, about 41 percent of human rights agreements contained no monitoring provisions
at all, which is almost the exact proportion for international agreements as a whole (40 percent). 43
The remaining 59 percent of human rights agreements sampled are fairly “densely monitored” and
commonly require states parties to report to “internal bodies” (e.g., treaty-based implementation
committees) and establish a formal monitoring role for existing intergovernmental organizations
(e.g., UN bodies) as well. For instance, since 2006, Universal Periodic Review has enhanced selfreporting to peers in the UN Human Rights Council. Overall, the international community depends
heavily on states parties to provide the raw material for human rights oversight. 44
In issue areas from arms control to the environment, and from trade to human rights, stategenerated information provision and review have been critical in increasing the transparency
necessary for treaty implementation. 45 But has self-reporting enhanced international human rights
treaty implementation? If so, how? It was certainly intended to do so, as the historical record
discussed in the next part demonstrates.
II. SELF-REPORTING UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Roderick Abbott, GATT and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Further Reflections on Earlier Reflections,
27 J. WORLD TRADE 117 (1993); Richard Blackhurst, Strengthening GATT Surveillance of Trade-Related Policies, in
THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 123 (Meinhard
Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1988); Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s Supremacy
in the International Trade Order: A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism,
16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 9 (2013).
39
Joseph E. Aldy, Policy Surveillance in the G-20 Fossil Fuel Subsidies Agreement: Lessons for Climate Policy
(Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 15-70, 2015), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/dp70_aldy.pdf.
40
David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Introduction and Overview, in THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 3 (David G.
Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B. Skolnikoff eds., 1998).
41
Id. at 11.
42
IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 29–47 (Jacob Werksman, James
Cameron & Peter Roderick eds., 1996).
43
KOREMENOS, supra note 31, at 261–62.
44
Dai, supra note 35, at 405.
45
Victor, Raustiala & Skolnikoff, supra note 40, at 24.
38
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Historical Development
Self-reporting is the tip of the spear of the accountability revolution in international human
rights. Before World War I, there are only hints of such accountability in areas we might recognize
as related to human rights. Reporting by states parties was discussed in the area of labor standards
and in limited regional agreements to address what today we call human trafficking for sexual
exploitation. As early as 1905, a draft labor convention called on national supervisory authorities
to “publish regularly reports on the execution of the present convention and to exchange these
reports among themselves.” 46
Two world wars changed global attitudes about state accountability, which was slowly
built into inter-war international law and organizations. In November 1918, the League of Nations
Committee on Labor urged governments to provide for the creation of an International Labor
Office in the Paris Treaty of Peace. This office would be charged with the “collection and
comparison of the measures taken to carry out international [labor] conventions and of the
government reports on their observance.” 47 The next year, an American draft included reference
to states parties reporting to the secretary-general of the League of Nations any actions taken in
response to a “recommendation of the General Conference [of Labor] communicated to it.” 48 The
International Labor Organization (ILO) constitution signed in 1919 ultimately required annual
reports that “shall be made in such form and shall contain such particulars as the Governing Body
may request.” 49
The Mandate System under the League of Nations also relied on reports from countries
charged with overseeing non-self-governing territories, a practice continued under the Trusteeship
Council of the United Nations. 50 Early human-trafficking conventions further signaled the
emergence of reporting norms. Agreements negotiated in 1904 and 1910 to curb trafficking in
prostitution had rudimentary information-exchange provisions, 51 and eventually came under the
supervision of the League’s Advisory Committee on the Traffic of Women and Children. 52 States
began reporting to Geneva on anti-trafficking measures in the early 1920s, 53 and the 1926 Slavery
Convention created an additional obligation to report relevant anti-trafficking laws to other parties
46
Sir Malcolm Delevingne, The Pre-War History of International Labor Legislation, in THE ORIGINS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, VOLUME ONE: HISTORY 3, 29–39 (James T. Shotwell ed., 1934).
47
Charles Picquenard, The Preliminaries of the Peace Conference, in THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOR ORGANIZATION, VOLUME ONE: HISTORY, supra note 46, at 88.
48
Edward J. Phelan, The Commission of International Labor Legislation, in THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOR ORGANIZATION, VOLUME ONE: HISTORY, supra note 46, at 159.
49
Treaty of Peace at Versailles, Art. 408, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry 188, 2 Bevans 235, 13 AJIL Supp. 151, 385
(1919).
50
Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. 22, June 28, 1919; Charter of the United Nations (1945), Arts. 73(e),
83, 87(a), 88.
51
International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic,” May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1
LNTS 83 (entered into force 18 July 1905); International Convention for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic,”
May 4, 1910, 211 Consol. TS 45, 1912 GR. Brit. TS No. 20, as amended by Protocol Amending the International
Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, and Amending the International Convention for the
Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 4, 1949, 2 UST 1999, 30 UNTS 23 (entered into force June 21, 1951).
103 BFSP 244 (1910).
52
See HENRY WILSON HARRIS, HUMAN MERCHANDISE: A STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN WOMEN 27
(1928).
53
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, concluded at Geneva on
Sept. 30 1921, as amended by the Protocol signed at Lake Success, New York, on Nov. 12, 1947, 9 LNTS 415 (entered
into force June 15, 1922); HARRIS, supra note 52, at 27.
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and the League secretary-general, 54 though it failed to provide procedures for review or followup. In 1930, the British government tried to use the Permanent Mandates Commission model to
gather information through reports to a “Permanent Slavery Organization,” but these efforts failed
due to the financial constraints of the inter-war depression and the outbreak of World War II. 55 A
more elaborated system for reporting and information sharing to counter human trafficking and
other rights violations would have to await the postwar period. 56
The postwar international order crucially changed the context for human rights.
Democratic governance was reestablished in many countries, including in the heart of Europe.
Transnational organizations and faith-based organizations found their voices in advocating for
human rights. Crumbling empires would be replaced by a wave of newly independent nation states.
Many of these emerging states found common cause with rights advocates in their calls for national
self-determination. 57
The postwar period was a watershed for both international human rights and for what has
been called the “regulatory turn” in international law. 58 This regulatory turn undoubtedly fueled
reporting as an enforcement mechanism, especially in international human rights law. Most
basically, state reporting was a way for the United Nations to collect information for law
development in the first place. 59 This role had been carried out on a limited basis under the League
of Nations, but it became more common and widespread as human rights principles were codified
in the early 1960s. 60 UN protocols increasingly called on states to submit information in the context
of conciliation and dispute-settlement procedures. 61 Of central concern here, state reporting was
employed first in general hortatory requests and then as a treaty obligation in an effort to secure
adherence.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the focus of these efforts. The
UN General Assembly and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) both passed resolutions
requesting information on state law and practice on human rights. As early as 1947, the General
Assembly recommended that the UN secretary-general request member states to report annually
to ECOSOC, which would in turn report to the General Assembly on steps taken to give effect to
“recommendations made by the General Assembly on matters falling within the Council’s
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competence.” 62 This resolution was intended to include UDHR principles, which had no explicit
provisions for implementation. Few states responded to such a general exhortation. ECOSOC thus
postponed systematic review and instead perused the few reports it received on an ad hoc basis.
Five years later, the submission of official state reports remained a rarity, so the Council
discontinued this system of self-reporting entirely. 63
In 1956, ECOSOC again passed a resolution calling for systematic self-reporting on human
rights. 64 It requested UN members to transmit reports every three years describing how they were
implementing UDHR principles. John Humphrey, then serving as rapporteur of the International
Committee on Human Rights, later reported that forty-one states (exactly half) responded as
requested in the first round of reporting, and sixty-seven (over 80 percent) responded in the second
round (1957–59). But Cold War rhetoric and a perfunctory review by the Human Rights
Commission rendered the exercise ineffective. 65 Self-reporting received a boost six years later,
when NGOs with consultative status in ECOSOC were invited to submit their views and
observations to the Council. 66 The system of “shadow reporting” by civil society organizations
was thereby conceived.
At best, the general call for reports on progress toward realizing the UDHR was a soft law
obligation. The problem remained state cooperation. In 1965, ECOSOC invited states to participate
in a three-year cycle of reporting on civil and political rights, economic and social rights, and
freedom of information. 67 This process routed state reports through the Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, which generally failed to read
them—an outcome John Humphrey called “a political victory won by governments who do not
favour the international enforcement of human rights.” 68 Rights advocates knew, however, they
were not in a position to do much more than request state information. Despite his frustrations,
Humphrey concluded that “[o]f the various techniques, reporting is the one with which the
international community has had the most and probably the most successful experience” and that
given government reticence to accept international oversight, “reporting may indeed, even for
these rights, be the most practical means of implementation.” 69
The Consent-Based Treaty System
Self-reporting as part of a consent-based treaty obligation was another route to enhance
implementation. This approach built on an explicit legal commitment and engaged expert
implementation committees rather than government-composed bodies of the United Nations. As
early as 1947, the Drafting Committee for the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) proposed a state reporting mechanism, to be triggered by UN General Assembly
resolution, for “an explanation, certified by the highest legal authorities of the State concerned, as
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to the manner in which the law of that state gives effect to any of the said provisions of this Bill of
Rights.” 70 The United States proposed amending this to regularized two-year intervals. 71 When
the commission on human rights resumed discussion of the draft in 1950, the Soviet Union and its
allies resisted the inclusion of any reporting procedures as contrary to Article 2.7 of the UN
Charter, which prohibits the UN from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state. 72 Resistance was due in part to the concern that while similar procedures
were developing with respect to the drafting of the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), that treaty was to be “progressively realized” while the ICCPR was
“intended, in the main, to be applied immediately.” 73 Moreover, the idea of reporting on progress
toward implementation might, some feared, undercut the idea that states should be in compliance
with the ICCPR upon ratification. 74
To whom reports would be submitted was initially controversial as well. On the one hand,
the idea of reporting to the General Assembly was anathema insofar as it meant that obligated
states would in effect be reporting to those who remained outside the treaty arrangement. 75 On the
other hand, some states objected to an autonomous body of individuals acting in their personal
capacity as experts. 76 The former view prevailed, although the final draft acknowledged that the
reports could also be forwarded to UN specialized agencies after consultation with the treaty
body. 77
The Cold War effectively put the adoption of the ICCPR and ICESCR on ice between the
tenth and twenty-first sessions of the Human Rights Commission (between 1954 and 1966). The
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), negotiated in the early 1960s
and entering into force in 1965, turned out to be the path-breaking treaty that provided the model
for nearly all major subsequent human rights agreements and established the precedent that human
rights treaties must contain some means for implementation. 78 While CERD drafters could look to
the (unadopted) drafts of the “international bill of rights,” the convention broke new ground as the
first major post-UDHR treaty in force to require states to report to a treaty body. As such, the
CERD provided an important model, especially for anti-discrimination treaties such as the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) negotiated a decade
later.
Several historical streams converged in the late 1950s and early 1960s to elevate racial
equality above “the sacred notions of sovereignty so closely guarded by many UN member
states.” 79 The civil rights movement highlighted embarrassing conditions in the United States and
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created a sense of urgency surrounding the CERD. 80 Following the Holocaust, Israel pushed
vocally for racial and religious tolerance. South African apartheid was also a focal point for the
evils of extreme racial discrimination. But the decolonization movement itself provided the
necessary condition for accelerating and strengthening international commitments to
nondiscrimination based on race. It rapidly transformed the UN’s composition, and the leadership
of an Afro-Asian coalition spearheaded by Ghana, the Philippines, and others united the newly
independent states. 81 In the Cold War context, decolonization also provoked the major powers to
engage.
This global political context made possible consideration of binding legal obligations
forbidding discrimination based on race. The CERD draft developed alongside the ICCPR and
ICESCR, and as the first of the three to enter into force provided the model for implementation
that would be replicated with only minor variations in subsequent agreements: a triad of
petitioning, state-to-state complaints, and self-reporting to a treaty body. The first of these was
optional and voluntary, as in every treaty to come. The second, while obligatory under CERD, is
optional for all subsequent treaties and altogether absent from CEDAW. Moreover, it has scarcely
been used. The third provided the minimum floor for treaty implementation. As the most broadly
used component of the triad—and because of the institutional path dependence initiated by
CERD—it is worth excavating the logics and interests expressed at its creation.
Debates over the CERD text reveal a keen sense of the limits of law alone to ensure
compliance with international human rights obligations. Treaty drafters did not see public
production of information as an alternative for international rule of law but as a complement.
Delegates realized that racial attitudes were stubborn and would require treaty law, education,
information, and supportive media and courts. 82 Self-reporting was considered a potentially
powerful way to develop state capacity to prevent and punish racial discrimination. Some of the
most powerful delegations were interested in pushing toward “fact-finding and reporting
machinery . . . of the United Nations” so that members could be “helped to build up national
institutions and national laws to give practical meaning to the principles endorsed by the draft
Declaration.” 83
But what should CERD reporting obligations look like? Three models were debated. 84 In
one, states would report in the context of quasi-judicial or conciliatory processes. In a second,
reports would originate from civil society alleging treaty violations. 85 In a third, states would report
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regularly on their own implementation, 86 with Costa Rica drafting an amendment additionally
inviting what are referred to today as civil society shadow reports. 87 Each mechanism had
recognized weaknesses. State-based procedures were subject to politics, and their “effectiveness
suffered accordingly.” 88 Critics argued that ad hoc individual complaints would not assure
legislative implementation. 89 States reluctant to empower private actors in an international treaty
criticized civil society initiation as unproductive. 90 Periodic state reports were considered “useful
but . . . not enough, since they did not allow for intervention at the time when a violation took
place.” 91
Self-reporting was an important supplement to other measures and commonly mentioned
as “the bare minimum” 92 for implementing a serious human rights agreement. At least one state
(Jamaica) emphasized the value of examination, review, and evaluation attendant to the obligation
to report. 93 Ultimately, all three approaches were adopted in CERD: conciliation procedures were
established, 94 periodic reporting was required by states, 95 and complaints by private individuals
were permitted. 96 Despite concerns about redundancy associated with reporting for each individual
treaty, 97 the three major multilateral human rights treaties of the 1960s—CERD, ICCPR, and
ICESCR—each developed their own fairly similar implementation committees and reporting
regimes. 98
After a lull in human rights codification, the international community turned to women’s
rights. Early treaties dealing with women’s rights had practically no implementation provisions. 99
But by early 1967, the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) began drafting a
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by the General Assembly in November of that year. 100 ECOSOC and CSW worked on strategies
for implementing the declaration over the next several years. In the hortatory tradition described
earlier, one tactic was to ask states to submit voluntary reports on their implementation efforts, but
this request elicited little cooperation. 101 By the mid-1970s, the CSW began working on a
comprehensive and legally binding instrument, soliciting comments of governments and
specialized agencies.
Self-reporting requirements were a central part of the discussions of the Working Group
that drafted CEDAW. Although an early Soviet draft did not contain a reporting requirement,
directing only that ECOSOC consider implementation periodically, 102 initial discussions revealed
a willingness to include one, with most states considering the ILO, CERD, or ICCPR to be
appropriate models. 103 The Netherlands called for civil society participation, “granting these
organizations . . . a role in channelling [sic] wishes and complaints towards an international
forum,” such as the CSW. 104 Canada suggested that all reporting go through the CSW to avoid
“conflict in implementation procedures” across treaties. 105 Several countries anticipated the
modern critique of reporting overlap, and called for simplification. 106 Women’s groups were
strongly behind reporting; in fact the draft article on state reporting was the only provision
mentioned explicitly in a crucial 1976 statement by a broad coalition of women’s NGOs sent to
the Working Group. 107 In the end, Egypt, Nigeria, and Zaire’s proposal to use language almost
identical to that contained in the CERD was accepted. 108 A series of working groups finalized the
agreement in 1979, and the CEDAW—with Article 18 describing the obligation to report on
implementation—opened for signature the next year.
Current Practice and Recent Reforms
Today, each of the nine core international human rights conventions establishes an
independent treaty body to monitor implementation. 109 These committees are comprised of ten to
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twenty-three independent experts nominated and elected by states parties for fixed, renewable
terms of four years. By virtue of treaty ratification, states must submit periodic reports to each
committee—ranging from every two to every five years—on the legislative, judicial,
administrative, or other measures adopted to give effect to human rights obligations. 110 Periodic
reporting has thus become an aspect of procedural compliance with a government’s treaty
obligations. 111 Niger submitted the first ever state report to the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination in January 1970. By 2017, the committees for the nine core treaties had
received on average 129 state reports each year. 112
The treaty bodies largely employ the same general framework in examining reports. While
not required, committees invite government delegations to Geneva to participate in an in-person
consideration of the report. 113 A team of government officials appears before the treaty body for
two or three three-hour discussions. Each review begins with the state’s introductory statement
followed by committee acknowledgement of the state’s implementation progress. Rapporteurs are
assigned to each country to provide a comprehensive overview of missing information, identify
discrepancies between domestic and treaty law, point to previous recommendations on which they
saw no progress, and request follow-up information on these recommendations. 114 Questions by
other committee members follow. Sometimes state representatives answer on the spot; other times
the government commits to follow up in writing. Committee members use this interaction to
expound on what is normatively appropriate under the treaty. This so-called “constructive
dialogue” provides an opportunity for mutual engagement, acknowledgment of progress made,
and identification of areas for improvement. 115
Initially, the treaty bodies did not provide any collective assessment following their review.
In 1980, the Human Rights Committee (ICCPR’s treaty body) extensively debated whether or how
it should express comments on state reports. Most committee members favored committee reports,
“conducted in such a way as not to turn the reporting procedure into contentious or inquisitory
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proceedings, but rather to provide valuable assistance to the State party concerned in the better
implementation of the provisions of the Covenant.” 116 However, a minority supported the German
Democratic Republic’s view that the committee’s primary function was not to “interfere . . . in the
internal affairs of States parties,” but instead to merely include within its annual reports general
comments addressed to all states parties. 117 A Soviet-coordinated bloc of members thus prevented
treaty bodies from being able to pass judgment on the human rights situations in states throughout
the 1980s. 118 This changed in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War. Now all committees publish
some form of “concluding observations” containing recommendations for specific reforms a
government should undertake to address implementation shortcomings. 119 Most commentators
agree that these recommendations are not legally binding, 120 but all state reports and committee
observations are made public 121 and sometimes cited by domestic and regional courts, 122 arguably
raising the political stakes of ignoring them.
These basic elements have remained essentially unchanged, although a few reforms have
been introduced to help strengthen the treaty-body system. The creation of the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 1993 was transformatory. 123 Before its creation,
there was almost no capacity for human rights training 124 or strategic thinking on reform. 125 Far
from just another example of an inflated UN bureaucracy, its establishment was a game changer
that greatly improved the international community’s capacity to make state reporting meaningful.
First, the OHCHR harmonized reporting guidelines across treaties, at the request of the
General Assembly. 126 These include guidelines on a “common core document,” which provides
background information, the general framework for the protection and promotion of human rights,
and information on effective remedies. States need submit only one common core document to all
treaty bodies, updating as necessary. This reduces reporting redundancy and encourages states to
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report periodically on treaty-specific information. The guidelines also limit the length of periodic
reports.
Second, to improve the quality of the constructive dialogue, some committees began giving
states a set of questions in advance of their report’s review. They further expanded on this practice
by making available a simplified procedure employing a “List of Issues Prior to Reporting”
(LOIPR). 127 The state party’s replies to the LOIPR count as its report for that treaty. In 2014, the
General Assembly adopted a resolution that encouraged use of this simplified procedure across all
treaty bodies. 128 It has since become standard practice to focus on these priorities, and the chairs
of the treaty bodies—with the assistance of the OHCHR Secretariat—have made efforts to further
harmonize their simplified procedure working methods in light of the 2020 treaty body review. 129
This includes recently agreeing to coordinate each treaty’s list of issues for a given country, to
reduce unnecessary overlap.
Third, the OHCHR invested in developing state capacities. 130 In 2015, the OHCHR
enhanced regional training and workshops on state reporting, and developed a Practical Guide for
reporting and follow-up in 2016. 131 The OHCHR also encouraged the establishment of dedicated
national mechanisms to coordinate reporting and follow-up across national institutions and civil
society. 132
Finally, the OHCHR took a leading role in providing support to a range of stakeholders, so
that they might better engage with the periodic review process. It works closely with national
human rights institutions (NHRIs) to support their interaction with the treaty bodies and civil
society organizations. 133 A number of NHRIs now hold national consultations on report
preparation or otherwise provide input to the state report; several submit alternative reports and/or
provide oral briefings to the treaty bodies, either prior to or during the constructive dialogue. 134
The OHCHR also encourages civil society participation by providing treaty-specific guidelines for
submitting shadow reports and attending sessions. 135
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Assessments of Self-Reporting
How effective has this system of self-reporting been over the past half century? Although
positive assessments are hard to find, a few authors note that self-reporting can, under some
circumstances, have positive effects. Sally Engle Merry finds in her study of gender violence that
NGOs have used the CEDAW Committee’s concluding remarks to pressure governments to
protect women from violence. 136 Xinyuan Dai reports positively on the informational role that
independent NGOs play in the monitoring process. 137 A study by C.H. Heyns and Frans Viljoen
mentions several committee observations and recommendations that have been flagrantly ignored,
but lists others that have been heeded, such as the release of prisoners in Egypt, the disbanding of
armed civilian groups in Colombia, and attention to minority cultural rights in Estonia. 138 Positive
accounts typically stress that the influence of this process is diffuse and indirect, with the media,
NGOs, domestic actors, and other governments using the committees’ concluding observations to
pressure governments for change. 139
Much more common are criticisms of the system as inadequate, ineffective, and even “in
crisis.” 140 Many governments fail to report altogether. 141 Reports vary considerably across
countries and over time in their structure and quality. 142 Some commentators suggest that reporting
varies by treaty as well: it may be easier to engage with obligations under CEDAW and CRC rather
than on torture and civil rights. 143 States often provide inconsistent and meaningless data in their
reports, making it hard to assess implementation. 144 Quality reporting requires expertise in and
familiarity with the treaty and the reporting process, which many states apparently lack. And of
course, capacity is not the only issue. Some states simply refuse to render self-critical reports, 145
and even resource-rich democratic states do not always do what experts tell them they should do. 146
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Government commitment and state capacity both tend to contribute to compliance with
reporting requirements. Gross domestic product per capita is strongly associated with the
likelihood of reporting, suggesting that wealthier states are better able to bear the costs of
compiling legislation, collecting data, and studying outcomes. For some treaties (such as CAT and
CRC) bureaucratic capacity (in the form of an NHRI) also correlates with report submission as
well as reporting quality. 147 NHRIs supply for many states the institutional capacity needed to
provide factual knowledge of, expertise in, and familiarity with the treaty regime and reporting
process. 148 Two other factors also correlate with better reporting: commitment to human rights law
(widespread human rights treaty ratification) and regional reporting norms and socialization (the
higher the regional reporting density, the more likely a state from that same region will report).
States with the resources and a broad legal commitment to international human rights treaties are
much more likely to turn in their reports than are poor states and spotty ratifiers. It is, however,
not the case that nondemocratic countries or those with poor human rights records systematically
avoid reporting. 149
Much of the criticism leveled at the self-reporting process focuses on the oversight
machinery itself. 150 Bias and politicization of the process is a common concern. By 2000, almost
half of the elected treaty-body members had been government employees. 151 It is easy to find
disparaging accounts of some committee members’ commitment to the task at hand, 152 and other
members’ ritualistic commentary and superficial questioning. 153 Cultural insensitivity further
reduces genuine dialogue and leads to formalistic recommendations that many states are unlikely
to take up. 154 In addition, some governments complain the treaty bodies have overreached,
assuming “additional responsibilities not envisaged in the . . . treaties.” 155
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The oversight machinery is severely under-resourced, leading to a host of inadequacies.
Committee members are not paid and often employed by governments or other institutions with
the potential to compromise independence. They are swamped with work and sometimes take more
than a year to respond to state reports. 156 Despite this, over the past two years the General
Assembly adopted budget cuts that significantly impacted the treaty body system, which now faces
a serious financial crisis and at one point the possibility of cancelled meetings in order to cut
costs. 157 The capacity to follow up in practice on their recommendations is also severely limited. 158
While the OHCHR Secretariat and treaty body chairs have recently made efforts to harmonize and
strengthen the follow-up procedure for urgent recommendations, the CRC Committee has
discontinued follow-up due to resource constraints. 159 Repeatedly, the individual committees miss
opportunities to work across institutions, such as when economic, social, and cultural rights are
violated during periods of transitional justice. 160
Once concluding observations are rendered, there is little consensus on their impact.
Several studies discuss their influence, but it is hard to tell whether the glass is half empty or half
full, what criteria authors use to determine effectiveness, and whether the committees’
observations play any causal role. 161 Most literature on the treaty bodies is descriptive, and while
many observers move readily from description to critique and policy recommendations, 162 it is
difficult to infer what contribution the process has made to rights on the ground. Critics assert that
those most affected by treaty violations are not even aware of the periodic review process. HafnerBurton summarizes an informal (and untested) consensus among commentators that “the reports
often don’t seem to lead to results that matter.” 163
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Despite these critical assessments, recent cross-national studies have found a correlation
between reporting and better rights outcomes. 164 How might this be explained? The next Part
theorizes the mechanisms through which self-reporting might lead to improvements.
III. MECHANISMS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENT
“Self-reporting” is a much more complex system than the name implies. It is not
synonymous with whitewashed documents that receive brief acknowledgement in Geneva and then
never see the light of day. Every step of this process creates opportunities for impact (and
potentially backlash). Reviewing laws and collecting new data involve activating a domestic
bureaucracy. Actors who otherwise might not have the chance to form coalitions, alter the policy
agenda, or provide different versions of the status of treaty implementation are at least minimally
empowered. The reporting process also offers external experts an opportunity to teach about
international obligations, produce actionable recommendations, and learn about constraints
experienced and resistance encountered. While not a panacea for protecting human rights, selfreporting is an opportunity to persuade, learn, build capacity, mobilize politically, and contribute
to transnational law development. It is a crucial part of a broader system of human rights
accountability.
Global correlations linking participation in the report-and-review process with rights
improvements exist, notably for CEDAW and CAT. 165 But a theoretical account of the
mechanisms underpinning these correlations is needed. Where feasible, we present global evidence
to demonstrate the plausibility of these mechanisms for four treaty regimes: ICCPR, CEDAW,
CAT, and CRC.
We limit our focus to these four treaties for a number of reasons. These represent some of
the most important core multilateral human rights treaties, covering a broad range of universal as
well as group-specific rights. Yet they also vary in ways that permit examination of the selfreporting process in distinct contexts. Each entered into force at different historical moments but
all have been in force long enough for significant state reporting histories to accumulate. In
particular, the ICCPR—one of the conventions comprising the “international bill of rights”—
enables evaluation over four decades and a broad range of rights. The other three represent “single
issue” conventions situated within a broader regime organized around their respective issues, ones
that often stimulate specialized interest group attention. 166 The CAT covers protections that touch
on issues tied to national security and crime control (i.e., prisons and policing) and thus represents
a hard case for the reporting process to influence policymakers. The CEDAW also represents a
hard case in that it touches on culturally sensitive issues, but has a somewhat unique institutional
history with a dedicated bureaucracy—now UN Women, the Secretariat of the Commission on the
Status of Women—and active involvement by organized women’s rights NGOs. It is also the
second most widely ratified international human rights instrument, behind the CRC, which is
ratified by every member of the United Nations save the United States. Like CEDAW, the CRC
also touches on sensitive public/private sphere issues and mobilizes highly organized children’s
rights NGOs.
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The analysis is limited temporally given the data demands to make a persuasive case, with
a cut-off date of December 2011 for CAT and December 2014 for ICCPR, CEDAW, and CRC
(see Online Appendix A for a description of the data collection process, coverage, and coding
procedure). This precludes discussion of the self-reporting process in light of recent critiques of
the treaty body system and its budgetary crisis, but the conclusion offers thoughts on implications
for the current political moment.
Since self-reporting processes are complex and contextual, at times the empirical focus is
limited to one region—Latin America. There are both practical and theoretical reasons for this
choice. In practical terms, states in this region have in fact ratified the relevant conventions. Many
were early parties and have committed to multiple agreements, providing a rich source of data.
This contrasts with other regions, notably Asia and the Middle East, where governments have been
more hesitant to ratify or have tended to do so with very broad reservations. While reservations do
not preclude inclusion, ratification is a necessary condition for investigating the power of the
report-and-review process. Further, Latin America is linguistically accessible, which allows for a
deeper and more consistent qualitative examination of the posited mechanisms compared to a
sampling of more countries with higher linguistic barriers. Tradeoffs are unavoidable; we have
chosen to probe more deeply within a limited set of documents rather than attempt a broader but
more superficial treatment.
Latin America is also a theoretically appropriate sample for a number of reasons. Human
rights violations historically have been a serious issue in Latin America and reporting has varied
across countries, by treaty, and over time. This is by no means an “easy” region for demonstrating
the plausible influence of self-reporting processes on outcomes. Nevertheless, the conditions for
such influence seem present: there is at least a modicum of elite acceptance of and integration into
international legal institutions. With relatively democratic institutions, active civil society, and (to
varying degrees) meaningful press freedom, states across Latin America are plausible candidates
to investigate the potential impact of the periodic review process on rights protections.
Elite Socialization
Socialization is the process through which people adopt the norms, values, attitudes, and
behaviors that a group accepts and practices. It involves cognitive elements, such as mechanisms
of persuasion that changes actors’ minds about facts, values, or norms; it also entails social
influences, akin to peer pressure associated with the desire for social acceptance, which leverages
praise, opprobrium, and other intangible rewards and punishments. 167 In the context of periodic
review, elite socialization refers to the process through which officials participating in the
preparation, presentation, discussion, and follow-up associated with reporting come to understand
what the international community (represented by committee experts) means by implementation
of and compliance with treaty obligations. Socialization suggests that government officials may
seek to gain this community’s acceptance and respect by demonstrating pro-social behaviors in
words and actions. As such—and in contrast to learning, discussed below—socialization is an
inherently intersubjective process. It depends on the interaction of the individual and the
reference group, and denotes the process through which the former comes to adopt the norms
and values of the latter.
167
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Socialization theory assumes that elites are open to persuasion and/or peer pressure to
conform to international standards. This seems plausible in the treaty-monitoring context.
Participating in the constructive dialogue is consent-based, suggesting that no participant has a
serious issue with the treaty body’s authority to undertake its review. States parties elect committee
members purported to be independent experts of high moral character, who psychological studies
find are viewed as more credible and under many circumstances more persuasive than nonexperts. 168 The perceived authoritativeness may thus imbue expert committees with normative
power to persuade. 169 Social psychological research also suggests that persuasive attempts are
more likely to be effective when conveyed in person rather than virtually or at a distance. 170 As
an in-person and iterative process, government officials participating in periodic review are likely
to find themselves in regular conversation with the committees, reinforcing socialization efforts
and effects. At the very least, reporting generates discussion about treaty obligations’ meaning—
an integral part of the compliance process. 171
Criticism, disapproval, and even moderate shaming are also integral to socialization. These
social cues alter the costs associated with disapproved behaviors, social psychological costs that
socialization theories emphasize involve a desire for group acceptance. 172 The treaty bodies aim
to avoid aggressive and overt “naming and shaming” approaches in favor of tempered disapproval
and constructive dialogue. 173 Felice Gaer (who currently sits on the Committee Against Torture)
notes the advantages of a “dialogue” over a “confrontation,” and that dialogue has generated better
outcomes than the more confrontational approach of the former Human Rights Commission. 174 To
be sure, treaty bodies are clear about areas where states fall short and have failed to make progress.
Such clarity furthers “[t]he very process of identifying, describing, and controlling human rights
practices [which] helps the diffusion of the human rights discourse through global and local
levels.” 175 Committee reviews are made public, which not only diffuses compliance norms but
potentially influences officials’ reputations as well. 176 Even if initial participation in the reportShelly Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of
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and-review process is motivated by rote adoption of superficial “scripts of modernity,” it exposes
governments to broader acculturation pressures for implementation and compliance. 177
Are government officials socialized to the reporting process and to international human
rights norms more generally? Evidence can be found in the communicative process, in the form of
(1) committee language consistent with socialization (praise and opprobrium in service of clear
implementation standards), and (2) target engagement suggestive of increasing government
understanding of the rules, norms, and purposes of reporting. The first implies that the committees
communicate in a way that is plausibly persuasive; the second implies that the reporter
communicates back: “I get it.” Empirically, we look for persuasive tone and language from
committee members and higher quality, more thorough, and responsive reports from states over
time.
Committees’ Communicative Choices: Preparing the Conditions for Socialization
Research on social persuasion suggests that language matters, and that persuasive
communication must walk a fine line between normative clarity on the one hand and threatening
or condescending language on the other. 178 Cultivating trust also has a significant impact on the
prospects for persuasion. 179 While we do not have irrefutable causal proof that government elites
have in fact become socialized by the periodic review process, we do demonstrate that the process
displays theoretically necessary preconditions for socialization to occur and that it is thus
conducive to that end.
If committees are communicating in order to socialize, we would expect them to frame
comments using respectful language, in order to elicit genuine consideration of their suggestions.
To maximize the possibilities for persuasion, we should see committee members keeping
discussions professional, as research consistently shows that perceived expertise is positively
associated with persuasion. 180 We would further expect that committee language stresses
normative clarity, and evinces both back-patting and mild forms of criticism. To find evidence of
socialization efforts, we examined in detail the history of committees’ communicative choices
during constructive dialogues with five Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Uruguay), across the four core treaties on which this Article focuses (ICCPR, CEDAW,
CAT, and CRC).
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In the early years of the treaty-body system, committee members used formal, diplomatic,
and often deferential language, particularly when discussing obligations that implicate national
security or core societal norms or values. For example, during the Cold War the Human Rights
Committee was rarely explicitly critical. It was not “uncommon for certain states, regardless of
their human rights record, to be treated with ‘kid gloves.’” 181 Members typically elaborated on the
scope and interpretation of specific covenant provisions (cuing their expertise) and then requested
further clarification about legislation to indirectly highlight where there might be inconsistencies
with ICCPR provisions (mild shaming). 182 The committee’s deft requests in 1980 for clarification
of Colombia’s law and practices prior to cautiously worded suggestions provide one example.183
There were undoubtedly exceptions in the early years, particularly for Latin American countries
with military regimes or states of emergency. Stressing normative clarity, committee members
could be quite blunt when they thought there was a significant gap between a state’s laws and
international norms. 184
The diplomatic and indirect approach began to shift in the late 1980s, with committee
members much more willing to identify directly inconsistencies between domestic law and treaty
obligations. Over the 1990s, members increasingly drew attention to insufficient legal
implementation. For instance, the CAT country rapporteur for Uruguay’s second review explicitly
stated that the Penal Code’s two-year sentence for abuse of authority was “insufficient” in light of
Article 2 of the convention. 185 Another member noted an additional “contradiction” between the
Penal Code’s inclusion of a due obedience defense and convention obligations and asked the
delegation to “express its views on that contradiction.” 186 Members were sometimes loath to
explicitly identify violations in practice, but a few began to do so, often avoiding direct accusations
by drawing attention to alleged incidents of non-compliance from NGO or U.S. State Department
accounts and asking the representative to comment on them. Allegations of torture incidents in
Argentina followed this pattern, 187 followed by solicitous back-patting for the country’s
commitment to preventing torture and improvements in other areas. 188 This is evidence of the
committees’ efforts to influence behavior through balanced concern and praise, while articulating
what counts as compliance with treaty obligations. Prompting government agents to reflect and
comment on implementation shortcomings represents a practice of “cuing,” a central tactic of
persuasion. 189
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, a few committees grew increasingly
confrontational, adopting tones that belied the notion of dialogue or persuasion. Confrontation
Buergenthal, supra note 118, at 355.
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tempered somewhat by the early 2010s, when the character of committee dialogues became less
accusatory and much more technical. States predominantly provided objective descriptions of
laws, policies, and practices, and committee members underscored their expertise with near
clinical assessments of (in)compatibility with treaty provisions, followed by detailed questions to
point to shortcomings or to clarify the situation. Committee members frequently draw from reports
by NGOs, the U.S. State Department, special procedures, regional human rights mechanisms, and
other treaty bodies’ concluding observations to flag discrepancies with the state’s report and
request clarification or comment. 190
Consistent with socialization theory, members telegraph their meaning using cooperative
and problem-solving language, sometimes following up critical assessments (mild shaming) with
assurances that we are here to help (identification and back-patting), and offering new or
alternative approaches to address recognized shortcomings. 191 During Chile’s most recent
CEDAW review, Patricia Schultz (Switzerland) commended the creation of the Technical
Secretariat for Gender Equality and Non-discrimination before noting that “action currently being
taken to guarantee equal access to justice and protection against gender stereotyping remained
either insufficient or insufficiently timely,” and suggesting that the Committee’s General
Comment No. 3 “could provide useful guidance for addressing that situation.” 192 A CAT
Committee member expressed alarm at the large number of individuals in pre-trial detention in
Colombia, stressing that the problem needed to be addressed “urgently and imaginatively,”
employing alternatives to detention such as electronic bracelets and community service. 193 In
discussing Mexico’s new legislative efforts on detention registers, another CAT Committee
member suggested that legislation include “robust mechanisms, such as the use of video recordings
and Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment, to guard against the falsification of
information.” 194
The normative strategy remains central: the word “should” appears frequently both during
the dialogue and within the concluding observations. To be sure, questioning remains demanding
and occasionally sharply critical. For example, Olivier de Frouville (France) began the second
session of Colombia’s most recent review before the Human Rights Committee by noting that “the
vagueness and evasiveness of the [delegation’s] replies . . . were making it difficult to engage in a
truly constructive dialogue” and that the information provided by the government “shed relatively
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little light on the state of implementation of the Covenant on the ground.” 195 A CAT Committee
member characterized Argentina’s recent proposed amendments to its criminal sentence
enforcement legislation as making “a mockery of the notion, enshrined in the Constitution, that
serving a sentence was a form of rehabilitation.” 196 Overall, however, there appears to have been
a clear shift to less politicized language by the 2010s, in line with many theories of persuasive
communication. Of course there is room for improvement: a number of government comments in
the context of the 2020 treaty body review note that the current process seems more like a “‘oneway dialogue’ that resembled an appearance before a court” 197 than a genuine dialogue, leading to
a “frustrated feeling of not having been heard.” 198 Such experiences may hamper elite
socialization, a point to which we return in the conclusion.
Socialization in Practice: Taking Reporting Seriously?
Have states become socialized to take their procedural obligations under treaties seriously?
Treaty bodies have set a public normative expectation that governments submit timely, responsive,
and transparent reports. Committees repeatedly and vigorously praise quality reports and express
disappointment at delayed submissions or reports that fail to conform to guidelines. 199 This is how
social norms are created and transmitted.
To find out whether states have become socialized into these reporting expectations, we
read all state reports (not just those for Latin America) submitted under four core human rights
treaties—ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC. Each was assigned a Quality Score, based on the
government’s willingness to recognize shortcomings in implementation or compliance and to
outline specific measures or efforts to address them (see Online Appendix A for the coding
procedure). Figure 1 shows the average quality scores for reports submitted under each treaty over
time. Improvements in report quality vary noticeably across treaties. The earliest reports were not
forthcoming in acknowledging shortcomings, but with the partial exception of CRC and ICCPR
reports in more recent years, they systematically improved in candor and transparency over time.
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Figure 1. Average report quality scores across four core human rights treaties. Average quality
scores assigned to all reports in a given year as a proportion of the total score a report could receive
(0–1). Report quality scores available for: ICCPR (1977–2014); CEDAW (1982–2014); CAT
(1988–2011); and CRC (1992–2014). See Online Appendix A for details on the coding instrument
and procedure.
Elite socialization also implies that governments become increasingly responsive to
committee concerns. To evaluate this expectation, we assigned all reports (except initial reports)
submitted under the same four core human rights treaties a Responsiveness Score, based on how
well the report engaged with the committee’s previous concluding observations (see Online
Appendix A for the coding procedure). Figure 2 shows state reports have become more responsive
to committee recommendations and concerns over time, though ICCPR reports tend to be
relatively less so than those under the other three treaties. This shift was reinforced in the 2010s
by the institutional reform of moving to the simplified reporting procedure. 200 Steady
improvements in responsiveness provide indirect evidence that elite socialization to international
norms is at work.

200
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Figure 2. Average report responsiveness scores across four core human rights treaties. Average
responsiveness scores are assigned to all subsequent reports in a given year as a proportion of the
total score a report could receive (0–1). Report responsiveness scores available for: ICCPR (1978–
2014); CEDAW (1991–2014); CAT (1992–2011); CRC (1997–2014). See Online Appendix A for
details on the coding instrument and procedure.
Finally, we expect governments to genuinely deliberate during the constructive dialogue.
Evidence points to language of both deliberative engagement as well as resistance during these
reviews. Examples of genuine engagement include Uruguay’s explicit recognition that it needed
to align its legal system with the CAT and its openness to the committee’s recommendations for
how to do so. 201 Similarly, Argentina told the Committee Against Torture that it considered its
definition of torture “sufficiently broad to cover the requirements of the Convention” but that
“it remained open to suggestions from the Committee in that regard.” 202 Before the Committee on
the Rights of the Child, an Argentine delegation “did not deny that . . . domestic legislation ran
counter to some of the recommendations set forth by the Committee,” then reminded the
committee of recent developments in case law. 203 Mexico accepted a CEDAW Committee
member’s observation that a discriminatory culture in the government remained a primary obstacle
to gender equality in politics, and committed to develop programs to help promote women at all
levels of government. 204 More recently, the Mexican delegation acknowledged the same
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committee’s concern that “much remained to be done to improve conditions for women in
detention.” 205
Clearly, states resist as well, particularly regarding matters that touch on national security
or core societal norms and values. An Argentine representative resisted a suggestion to review the
government’s criminalization of abortion. 206 Chilean representatives were particularly defensive
during the military government’s first review by the Human Rights Committee, noting that “some
members of the Committee had made highly politicized statements which had been repeated many
times in other forums.” 207 Such a statement demonstrates the limits of politicized shaming in this
setting; the committees themselves have returned to more professionalized assessments.
We can draw several conclusions from this exploration of the reporting process. First, it is
a process in which elite socialization—the gradual adoption of the norms, values, attitudes, and
behaviors accepted and practiced by a group—is possible. 208 Since confrontation and harsh
excoriation are likely to lead to backlash, treaty bodies are often careful to maintain a respectful
posture toward states parties, using diplomatic and increasingly technical language. Problemsolving language is common, suggesting an effort to cultivate a cooperative relationship while
inculcating international procedural and substantive norms. Second, the quality and responsiveness
of state reports represents evidence that (some) states are becoming socialized into international
norms of accountability.
Learning and Capacity Building
Learning Best Practices
The report-and-review process is a dialogue—not an exam and certainly not a trial. 209 It is
an opportunity for states to learn about best implementation practices or more efficient and
effective methods to improve treaty outcomes. When review and dialogue accompany selfreporting, opportunities arise for state and international elites to “learn more about one another’s
position and perspectives, desires and constraints.” 210 Learning exactly how to implement one’s
treaty obligations is thus a highly plausible explanation for the correlation between cumulative
reporting activity and rights improvements.
Implementing accepted norms—discussed above in the context of socialization—requires
knowledge. Even if we all affirm that torture is “bad,” people of goodwill might not know how to
keep it from happening. Even if we all agree that child labor is deplorable and not in a child’s
immediate interest or the long-run interest of a society, it is not altogether clear how to reduce it
when families need the extra income. Fair trials may be widely embraced in principle, but it is not
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immediately obvious how to better ensure them in practice (and often with limited resources). This
sort of learning is often factual and experiential, drawing heavily on a logic of consequences (“what
works”).
In this sense, self-reporting resembles a type of global experimentalist governance that
frames global issues in a rather open-ended way: how can women’s rights be strengthened? What
forms of police training have the best shot at reducing torture in detention centers? The
constructive dialogue attempts to solve such problems in light of locally generated knowledge and
experiences, thereby contributing to localized efforts to improve capacity and compliance.
Information has a major impact on political and policy behavior. 211 Learning from other
states’ experiences or from international organizations plays a central role in domestic regulatory
practice 212 as well as the diffusion of social and economic policies globally. 213 Learning is
voluntary, purposive, and involves seeking out information to help solve a problem based on an
improved understanding of what policies lead to better outcomes. 214 Multilateral reporting regimes
often engender transnational networks involved in common implementation and compliance
problems. 215 In this sense, self-reporting is less a mea culpa and more a part of what Charles F.
Sabel and others call “global experimental governance,” itself a response to conditions of
ignorance and uncertainty. 216
Both governments and the treaty bodies themselves can be expected to learn from the
report-and-review process. 217 As Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes argue, learning
processes are central to eliciting treaty compliance and effectiveness. 218 As early as 1953, the
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United States proposed that the goal of periodic review should be to “allow countries to draw
inspiration and guidance from the experiences of other countries when trying to solve their own
problems.” 219 Indeed, treaty bodies explicitly intend to convey the experience they have acquired
in their examination of other reports. 220 The treaty bodies draw on collective experiences and
information from myriad sources to expand knowledge available to governments and publics.221
States gain advice about modes of implementation not previously known or considered. Learning
is a shorter-term mechanism than elite socialization, though similarly iterative. Iterative reporting
builds on learning opportunities to improve policies and practices over time. 222
Records of the review process provide clear evidence that teaching and learning is a prime
goal of the committee members. The constructive dialogues and concluding observations are
replete with suggestions found to be effective elsewhere. For example, during Chile’s first review
before the Human Rights Committee, Christian Tomuschat (Federal Republic of Germany) noted
that “[e]xperience from other countries showed that workers had to be organized at the national
level if they were to be successful in defending their interests.” 223 In reviewing Chile’s most recent
report before the CEDAW Committee, Marion Bethel (the Bahamas) suggested the government
might consider prosecuting human traffickers under anti-money-laundering laws, noting that the
“Argentinian authorities had recently begun to move in that direction.” 224 Learning best practices
is similarly a goal for a number of governments who view the self-reporting process as an
opportunity to “help strengthen domestic implementation by identifying areas of good practice” 225
and to “shar[e] best practice examples.” 226
The committees’ highly visible General Comments further reinforce learning and sharing
of best practices. 227 In fact, this is their intended purpose. 228 General Comments are used to “share
best practices with states parties, identify barriers to the enjoyment of Covenant rights, and to
provide information on how rights violations may be prevented.” 229 For example, the Human
Rights Committee’s General Comment on freedoms of opinion and expression drew from over
one hundred concluding observations and individual communications to elaborate legislative
models for treaty implementation. 230
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This Article does not offer direct proof that participants have learned specific best practices
from interacting with the treaty bodies. Learning—and especially self-regulated learning—is
difficult to measure, even in well-controlled settings with calibrated instruments designed to do
so. 231 Nothing approaching a rigorous study of bureaucratic learning has been accomplished in the
human rights literature. Rather, our focus is on whether the right conditions for learning are present
during the report and review process.
To investigate this question, we looked to the composition of government delegations sent
to Geneva—and specifically delegates’ connections with relevant domestic lawmaking and
implementing organs—as a feature likely to improve the chances of carrying lessons back home.
Latin American delegations to the treaty bodies were examined for the ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT,
and CRC over the past decade. Governments typically send over a dozen officials with diverse
levels and types of expertise. A handful are permanent diplomats in Geneva who are unlikely to
return home with useful lessons on implementation. However, governments frequently send
individuals from ministries and agencies tasked with implementing specific treaty obligations. For
the CAT and ICCPR, representatives typically include both high-level officials and civil servants
working in human rights departments from a country’s Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign
Relations, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of the Interior. Delegations often include individuals
from the judiciary, senators, police chiefs, and a country’s NHRI. For CEDAW, many of the same
types of officials show up in Geneva, but they are typically led by a high-level official from a
National Institute/Council of Women (Argentina and Mexico), the Ministry for Women and
Gender Equity, the National Service for Women and Gender Equity (Chile), or similar institutions.
Likewise, CRC delegations include policymakers and civil servants from agencies that deal
specifically with youth planning and rights of the child.
The conditions for networked learning linked to domestic institutions and groups appear
particularly ripe. Domestic bureaucracies, inter-governmental agencies, and civil society
organizations have been found to interact within international institutions in complex ways, 232 and
in doing so act as transmission belts of knowledge flowing from the discussions with experts. This
conception of networked learning sees the reporting process as less of a do-as-you’re-told scolding
and more of an opportunity to educate parties, experts, and civil society about treaty obligations
and implementation difficulties.
Development of Capacity to Implement
Learning is not simply about acquiring knowledge, but further involves the development
of legal, technical, and institutional capacities to take action. The self-reporting process prompts a
government to collect and share information it might not otherwise have gathered, thereby
promoting self-assessment capacity. 233 The capacity to conduct a self-assessment potentially
brings more critical eyes to the status quo,234 ultimately revealing previously unnoticed gaps in
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rights protections. 235 Raised expectations that specific types of information should be produced
may further generate pressure for more transparency about the state of treaty implementation.
State reports reveal some capacity development over time. In addition to the general
increase in quality and responsiveness documented above, governments have made greater effort
to collect increasingly specific and disaggregated statistics relevant to treaty obligations. 236 To
confirm this, we coded every state report—not just those for Latin America—submitted under the
ICCPR, CAT, CEDAW, and CRC, for whether or not they contain meaningful numerical data
(Figure 3), by which we mean statistics about outcomes relevant to treaty obligations. 237 Gathering
data is only a first, albeit important, step. Such longitudinal quantitative data are important because
they contribute to assessing a problem’s extent, any improvements, and backsliding.

Figure 3. Average report data scores across four core human rights treaties. Average data scores
assigned to all reports in a given year as a proportion of the total score a report could receive (0–
1).
Many government bureaucracies initially did not report statistical information relevant to
implementation, most noticeably for civil and political rights and the ban against torture. Yet the
trend for reporting statistical information has increased steadily over the years. In 1990, fewer than
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10 percent of reports to the Human Rights Committee contained quantitative information. There
is a clear upward trend between approximately 1995 and 2005, followed by variability in the past
decade. Some data provision is nearly universal in CEDAW and CRC reports. While we cannot
speak to the accuracy of the statistics provided in reports, the trend may suggest a capacity to
collect and organize comparable information. One advantage for including data at all is that it can
be systematically contested by civil society and other skeptics. It also has uses beyond treaty
implementation. 238 Efforts to collect data are important for assessing the breadth of a problem and
the extent to which it is being addressed over time.
While it is appropriate to be skeptical of government-generated human rights data, its
production is not always entirely unsupervised. The OHCHR has been central in assisting the
development of information-collection capacities. It trains officials to use its Human Rights
Indicators guide to collect data in areas from health, water, and sanitation to education and fair
trials. 239 The OHCHR treaty-body capacity-building program established in 2015 similarly
organizes training workshops that focus on treaty-body reporting and data collection
methodologies. 240 Learning and capacity development are thus plausible channels for the positive
correlations earlier research established between participating in self-reporting and rights
improvements.
Public Attention
Self-reporting is not secretive. It is an acknowledged treaty obligation with potential for
public participation and contestation. At least some negotiators intended self-reporting to move
discussions about human rights from the halls of Geneva to civil society, the media, and eventually
the state’s legislative chambers, national courts, and executive agencies. Implementation
committees also stress governments’ obligation to raise awareness about human rights and to
disseminate committee recommendations among the population at large. 241 Public attention to the
report-and-review process may be another key reason that self-reporting correlates with rights
improvements.
Publicity, Information, and Accountability
Many theories of international legal compliance rely implicitly on the availability—
particularly to domestic publics—of information about government activities and legal
obligations. Information produced by international bodies informs domestic audiences about their
government’s (non-)compliance, allowing domestic constituencies to hold government officials
accountable. 242 Quantitative observational evidence, case studies, and experimental studies of
John D. Huber & Nolan McCarty, Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, & Political Reform, 98 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 481 (2004).
239
Human Rights Council, 27th Sess., Report of the OHCHR: Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building
Options for Integrating Human Rights into National Policies, para. 44, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/41 (July 24, 2014);
OHCHR, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation, UN Doc. HR/PUB/12/5 (2012).
240
Human Rights Council, 35th Sess., Report of the OHCHR: Progress and Challenges Encountered in the Main
Activities Aimed at Enhancing Technical Cooperation and Capacity-Building Undertaken Since the Establishment of
the Human Rights Council, para. 51, UN Doc. A/HRC/35/20 (May 3, 2017).
241
Human Rights Committee, 80th Sess., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, para. 7, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (adopted Mar. 29, 2004).
242
XINYUAN DAI, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND NATIONAL POLICIES (2007).
238

35

public opinion all suggest that human rights treaties raise domestic groups’ expectations that they
can demand treaty compliance. 243
International conventions are central in generating and publicly disseminating both
normative and empirical information. Normatively, treaties are focal instruments for public
audiences in the sense that they are nearly universally ratified statements of the international
community’s values relating to human rights. Experimental evidence suggests that agreements
framed as the product of consensus are more likely to garner public support. 244 Even though
treaties are sometimes ratified cynically, 245 they do shape understandings of what is and is not
acceptable human rights behavior. Their formality further enhances their ability to influence the
public’s normative understandings and expectations. 246
The report-and-review exercise is an extended and visible revelation of what the treaty
requires. Through their concluding observations, committees inform the public about the
normative definition of human rights obligations, such as, for example, what torture is. 247 Selfreporting also reveals empirical information. It generates details on legislation, statistics on
prisoner abuses, infant mortality rates, school enrollment figures disaggregated by gender, and
employment and wage discrimination. Importantly, the reporting process elicits nongovernmental
sources of information from civil society, various UN agencies, and special rapporteurs.
Mobilizing Civil Society Organizations
By mobilizing and empowering groups within and outside of government, reporting can
have a catalytic effect in promoting internal policy reform. A number of states consult with nongovernmental organizations in the preparation of their periodic reports. Committees’ concluding
recommendations further provide domestic constituencies with information to evaluate their
state’s treaty compliance, focusing domestic pressure on the government to perform better. Even
when states are less than forthright, their reports contain information nonstate actors can assess
and contest. 248 Examples abound, from Southeast Asia 249 to South Asia250 to Nigeria. 251
The process of reporting and responding has elicited significant public attention over time.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) are increasingly involved in the reporting process itself. Civil
society “shadow reports” are an effort to give voice to facts and views that may not be reflected in
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the governments’ reports. They are publicly available and have been posted on the OHCHR’s
website reliably since around 2007 (2009 for the CRC). Figure 4 charts patterns in shadow reports
per state report for four core treaties over time, effectively measuring the intensification of
public—and increasingly domestic—scrutiny of states reports. 252

Figure 4. Average shadow reporting per state report submission under four core human rights
treaties (all states).
NHRIs have weighed in since about 2011 as well. In some cases, there is a dramatic
increase in this form of public mobilization around the reporting process, especially for the ICCPR
and CEDAW, and a detectable increase for the CAT and CRC as well. If anything, Figure 4
understates the degree of civil society mobilization around the reporting process because many
reports are authored in the name of a broad coalition of local organizations. Notably,
implementation committees have begun to consider CSO reports even when states themselves fail
to report, underscoring the value of public engagement with implementation. As trends in shadow
reporting indicate, domestic civil society mobilization around human rights reporting has
intensified over time, complementing earlier claims about domestic bureaucratic capacity building.
By “domestic CSOs” we mean organizations based in-country that take primary responsibility for compiling
the report, even if assisted by an international nongovernmental organization. By contrast, “international CSOs”
operate on a (near-)global scale.
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Many civil society reports expose serious violations. Domestic CSOs revealed abuses of
women in prisons at the hands of male prison staff to the CEDAW Committee, an issue the
Argentine state report scarcely noted. 253 In the case of the CAT, Ecuador’s 2009 report spurred the
submission of a shadow report from the local Foundation for Integral Rehabilitation of Victims of
Violence, detailing ill-treatment in detention that conflicted with the government’s account. 254
These inconsistencies were in turn echoed in the Committee Against Torture’s concluding
observations. 255 Despite the central role civil society plays in the report-and-review process,
overreliance on often unverified information has sparked criticism in the context of the 2020 treaty
body review. 256 Some suggest that the unbalanced use of shadow reports could “create an
ambience of mistrust between Treaty Bodies and Member States.” 257 Such overreliance potentially
undermines the effectiveness of previously discussed socialization and learning mechanisms,
given that trust likely influences information processing and persuasion. 258
Media Attention
Broader societal mobilization depends at least initially on publicly available information
that self-reporting has taken place and the issues on which it focused. This section does not prove
that media attention has always led to rights improvements, but it does show that such conditions
for public accountability have emerged around the report and review process. Again, we look to
Latin America and two treaties (CEDAW and CAT) for evidence that this process seeps into local
news sources. 259
Figure 5 demonstrates a spike in local press attention to the review processes during the
year of review (year 0) for the aggregate of all Latin American countries searched. Moreover,
media attention to the reporting process continues after the formal review concludes. In the year
following review, the press continues to report on treaty implementation and committee
recommendations, compared with the years prior to review. For both the CEDAW and the CAT,
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the results peak as expected, most strongly for Mexico, but stories in the Venezuelan and Chilean
press are also strongly clustered for the CEDAW. Colombia and Argentina press coverage is
similarly strong for the CAT review process. Content analysis of these articles reveals that they
frequently are critical of government implementation and often draw attention to Committee
recommendations. 260 What is discussed in Geneva does not necessarily stay in Geneva.

Figure 5. Domestic media coverage of CEDAW and CAT review in Latin America. Average
number of domestic newspaper articles that reference the in-person periodic review and/or
concluding observations issued by the committee. Total articles within each country’s searchable
time period were summed and averaged across publications. Articles are centered on the year of
review (0). Coverage of CAT in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela;
and of CEDAW in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Contributing to Law Development
Finally, we consider a legal means by which the report-and-review process improves
human rights: through judicial decision making. Self-reporting and the role of courts are
complements rather than substitutes, 261 as the negotiators who designed the CERD reporting
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provisions understood. 262 The synergy between reporting and review on the one hand and
adjudicatory mechanisms of international human rights enforcement on the other is clear. For one
thing, the commitment to reporting is empirically consistent with a willingness to be bound to the
rule of law through quasi-adjudication (i.e., the individual complaint process). There is a strong
positive correlation, for example, between declaring one’s state bound by CAT Article 22 (an
optional obligation that gives individuals a right to petition for a rule-based decision of the
Committee Against Torture) and the likelihood of rendering a high-quality state report. 263 Indeed,
an Article 22 commitment is a much stronger predictor of turning in a report than is the propensity
to torture itself. 264
Furthermore, the treaty bodies themselves render decisions and views that inform and
reinforce the jurisprudence of courts. Not only are reporting and adjudication consistent, there is
substantial evidence of mutuality between these systems. The self-reporting regime contributes to
judicial decision making and vice versa. A recent study of domestic court decisions found
numerous citations to state reports, shadow reports, or committee recommendations, suggesting
their usefulness in domestic law enforcement. 265 They have also been helpful in contributing to
regional human rights enforcement. 266
To illustrate the contribution of self-reporting to law development, we searched the case
law of both the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the InterAmerican Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR) for every reference to a general comment, individual complaints decision,
concluding observation, or state report for the oldest six core human rights treaties: CERD, ICCPR,
ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, and the CRC. Not only are documents from the report-and-review
process useful for establishing fact patterns in domestic cases, they are becoming common as
sources for law elaboration in regional human rights courts. The doctrines developed in these
regional courts, in turn, plausibly help to enforce rights on the ground.
The ECtHR
The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber frequently references concluding observations, general
comments, and individual communications within its judgments, as seen in Figure 6. Many of
these references appear in the judgment’s section outlining “Relevant International Law and
Practice” and consist of quotations of relevant committee interpretations contained within
concluding observations and individual complaint decisions. By identifying concluding
observations as relevant law, the Court reaffirms that the treaty bodies develop international legal
standards that inform and reinforce its own case law. Indeed, the Court makes an effort to note
when treaty body interpretations are in line with Strasbourg case law, such as when it decided to
follow the “case law” of the Human Rights Committee for ICCPR Article 26 (on discrimination),
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which is similar to Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention. 267 In addition, both
concurring and dissenting opinions have drawn heavily on the treaty bodies’ normative output to
establish applicable international law standards and to help clarify the legal reasoning in the
majority judgment. 268

Figure 6. European Court of Human Rights. References to individual communications, general
comments, and concluding observations from the report-and-review process for the CERD,
ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC as a proportion of total Grand Chamber judgments.
Sometimes the ECtHR draws directly on treaty body views when developing its own,
region-specific legal principles enforceable on European countries. In Stoll v. Switzerland, the
Court drew from the language found within the Human Rights Committee’s concluding
observations on a United Kingdom report to determine whether Switzerland’s interference with
freedom of expression pursued a legitimate aim under Convention Article 10(2). 269 It held that the
concepts of national security and public safety “need to be applied with restraint and to be
interpreted restrictively,” citing the Human Rights Committee’s concluding observations as falling
“along the same lines.” 270 Similarly, in Maslov v. Austria the Court drew from a Committee on the
Rights of the Child general comment and concluding observations on Austria’s report to stress that
the “obligation to take the best interests of the child into account includes an obligation to facilitate
his or her reintegration” into society. 271
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The IACtHR
The IACtHR cites a range of committees’ general comments and concluding observations
even more frequently than does the ECtHR (Figure 7). 272

Figure 7. Inter-American Court of Human Rights. References to individual communications,
general comments, state reports, and dialogue/concluding observations from the report-and-review
process for the CERD, ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC as a proportion of total
judgments.
In a case challenging Costa Rica’s prohibition of in vitro fertilization, for example, the
Court drew from the Human Rights Committee’s and the CEDAW Committee’s concluding
observations and comments to help interpret whether Convention Article 4(1) on the right to life
requires the absolute protection of the embryo. Citing twenty-two separate concluding
observations, it noted how the Human Rights Committee understands “the right to life of the
mother is violated when laws that restrict access to abortion force women to resort to unsafe
abortion, exposing them to death.” This interpretation permitted the Court to “state that an absolute
protection of the prenatal life or the life of the embryo cannot be inferred from the ICCPR.” 273 It
similarly referenced CEDAW Committee concluding observations to establish that a “total ban on
abortion, as well as its criminalization under certain circumstances, violates the provisions of
[CEDAW].” 274 This judgment further refined and reaffirmed the Court’s reproductive health
jurisprudence to synergistically influence national case law in the region. 275
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The IACtHR also pointed to interpretations of the treaty bodies in the area of civil and
political rights. Concluding observations have informed the Court’s findings on the incompatibility
of amnesty laws for serious human rights violations with international law 276 and the risk to human
rights of permitting military units to act as judicial police. 277 In a case involving the lethal use of
force against Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic, the Court drew from concluding
observations of the Human Rights Committee and Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination regarding the government’s treatment of such migrants to support a finding that
there was de facto discrimination that led to a violation of their rights. 278 Similarly, it drew from
observations and recommendations by these two committees on Chile’s Counter-Terrorism Act to
support its finding that the government was disproportionately applying it to members of the
Mapuche indigenous people, in violation of their right to equal protection. 279 It also directly
incorporated recommendations of treaty bodies. In a case involving the death of 107 suspected
MS-13 gang members in a Honduran prison, the Court ordered reparations that included
recommendations made by the committees for ICCPR, CAT, and CRC to modify or repeal the
Penal Code’s definition and application of the offense of unlawful association. 280 This case in
particular helped develop the Court’s relatively sparse jurisprudence on organized crime by
requiring greater specificity on the offense of unlawful association in domestic criminal laws, an
issue likely to appear with greater frequency before the Court in future years. 281
These citations do not, of course, prove that states comply readily with these institutions
in all cases. Rather, they demonstrate the mutually reinforcing jurisprudential relationship that
plausibly strengthens and clarifies the rule of law. Existing studies have provided the causal and
contextual evidence of state compliance with the decisions of international and regional courts.282
Some studies suggest that law development and mobilization mechanisms may in fact interact, 283
since compliance with regional courts often depends on the political will to abide by these
institutions’ decisions.284 To the extent that the report and review process elaborates standards that
inform the decisions of regional and other courts, the causal pathway from reporting to improved
human rights practice is strengthened. Judicial decision making is thus another important
mechanism that helps explain the relationship between regular reporting and better human rights
outcomes overall.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored four mechanisms through which state self-reporting can lead to
positive consequences. Elite socialization, learning and capacity development, domestic political
mobilization, and law development all plausibly explain the correlation between iterative reporting
and improvements in human rights. The central contribution has been to demonstrate that
improved human rights practices on the ground are theoretically and evidentiarily connected to the
report and review process. Existing research has shown there is a statistically significant
relationship between cumulative participation in the report and review process for the case of the
CEDAW 285 and the CAT. 286 These four mechanisms help explain this relationship. Moreover,
evidence from the self-reporting process itself underscores that it can be meaningful. In this sense,
the “proof” of a causal relationship between reporting on the one hand and improvement in rights
outcomes on the other lies in a careful examination of how the process unfolds and strengthens
socialization, learning, political mobilization, and legal rules and standards.
In this final Part we consider possible unintended consequences of human rights selfreporting and highlight policy recommendations.
Good Intentions with Unintended Consequences?
A finding that self-reporting “works”—even when states have an incentive to shirk and
prevaricate—will strike some observers as hopelessly naïve. Critics look at the proliferation of
treaty obligations and assert that the reporting system is breaking under its own unwieldy
weight. 287 “Reporting fatigue” is a common diagnosis of the problem 288 and a major reason for
reporting delinquency. 289 But evidence of serious reporting fatigue is weak. Failure to report is
best explained by a lack of state capacity, not by the weight of the requirements. In fact, research
demonstrates that the more human rights treaties a state becomes party to, the more likely it is to
turn in a report, which does not support a theory of fatigue. 290 Similarly, reporting in one time
period does not reduce the probability of doing so later, as ought to be the case if fatigue contributes
to reporting delinquency. 291
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None of the qualitative reporting patterns we discussed above fit a “fatigue” profile.
Reports are generally of demonstrably higher quality over time, increasingly responsive to the
treaty bodies, and consistently provide relevant data. In fact, a closer look at the reports themselves
shows that their quality improves as more reports are turned in. This pattern is not consistent with
reporting fatigue. But to the extent that states are tired of rendering multiple reports, reforms aim
to address such concerns through a single Common Core Document for all treaty bodies,
harmonized reporting guidelines, and the simplified reporting procedure. 292 Fatigue is not
fundamental to a self-reporting system; many issues can be streamlined and simplified. Indeed, a
number of reforms proposed as part of the 2020 treaty body review process aim to do just that.
Perhaps a more insidious critique is that reporting may become a bureaucratized end in
itself. The goal of this entire exercise is ultimately to improve human rights, 293 not to collect
reports, write recommendations, or even improve the compliance rate with concluding
observations per se. When bureaucrats focus on the procedures of reporting they risk falling prey
to “regulatory ritualism,” a phrase used to characterize rote adherence to institutionalized
procedures while losing focus on rights outcomes themselves. 294 Treaty-body periodic review risks
fetishizing submission of reports to the detriment of improvements in human rights practices on
the ground. 295
It is thus crucial to understand how and why self-reporting and review produce results. The
magnitude of such effects is modest, but clearly detectable. The self-reporting process is
evolutionary, not revolutionary, and is certainly one part of a wider ecosystem of human rights
accountability. But research demonstrates that repeat participation in the process sometimes results
in important improvements. 296 Moreover, the proof—the why and the how—is in the process:
engagement quality is improving, not declining. Ritualism may be a risk, but even actors who think
they are engaged in ritual may be socialized into meaningful dialogue. This Article has
demonstrated that eager publics and alert press reporters have not permitted the process to become
meaninglessly performative across the board.
Policy Recommendations
Self-reporting systems are dynamic and change over time. They start low-key but implicitly
ratchet up the reputational consequences of non-cooperation, even in the absence of any formal
capacity to punish or enforce standards. 297 Reporting expectations increase with both the reporting
behavior of peers and mobilization by civil society. Over time, the oversight committees
themselves help clarify these expectations.
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Of course, critics of periodic review are right about a number of its shortcomings. In light
of the General Assembly’s 2020 review of measures to strengthen the treaty-body system, it is
imperative to consider what our findings can tell us about reforms that would improve the system’s
capacity to enhance rights protections. We suggest the following set of policy recommendations
that would reinforce the operation of the mechanisms identified herein as central to the quality of
the self-reporting process.
First, treaty bodies should increase efforts to encourage states to participate, especially to
submit their first report, since doing so familiarizes governments with the process. The positive
returns to reporting imply that treaty bodies should also work hard to get states to return to the
process if they have been absent. 298 This could be done via public praise for participation or media
releases that showcase exemplary reporters. To the extent that greater participation is hampered
by resource constraints, proposals to hold reviews in OHCHR’s regional offices via
videoconference with the committees have some merit. 299 In-person dialogues may be more
conducive to socialization than virtual interactions, 300 but financial considerations currently
prevent a broad range of government officials from less resourced states from attending the review
process. The benefits of frequent and broad participation must be balanced against the less potent
influence of persuasion through a virtual dialogue.
Second, as socialization research makes clear, the nature of the dialogue with treaty bodies
is central to successful internalization of rights norms. Committee members’ language and tone
matter. Many governments have suggested the dialogue should follow a more “positive” 301 and
“constructive” 302 narrative geared toward a “positive impact on the ground through
implementation,” 303 which would facilitate socialization and learning. Despite an increasing turn
to grades and rankings at the international level, 304 we discourage the use of performance “grades”
by the treaty bodies. 305 Persuasion is potentially undermined by a superficial scramble to avoid
low marks.
Expertise is also central to the process of persuasion, suggesting that the independence and
professional qualifications of the treaty body members should be a focus of reform efforts. 306 A
number of state comments for the 2020 review express support for or concern about members’
independence and impartiality. 307 Several proposals seek to ensure the expertise of members,
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through an external assessment of candidates’ qualifications and a transparent selection process. 308
Importantly, both the dialogue’s quality and reviewers’ expertise distinguish it from the peerreview process of the Universal Periodic Review, which should be seen as a complement and not
a substitute to self-reporting under human rights treaties. 309
Third, the composition of delegations sent to Geneva—and particularly the representatives’
connectedness to domestic policy implementation—improves the chances for relevant lessons to
seep into policy discussions back home. This suggests that the treaty bodies should discourage
delegations dominated by diplomats and instead encourage high-level ministers as well as lowerlevel officials who will be intimately involved in the technical implementation of specific
recommendations. This includes members of the legislative and judicial branches, and officials
involved in developing and implementing treaty-specific policies, such as police chiefs for the
CAT.
Fourth, successful learning and capacity development depend on interactive dialogue,
geared toward problem-solving and resulting in a limited set of priority recommendations that are
targeted and actionable. 310 The effectiveness of such frank discussion would be further
strengthened by using “smaller and more flexible” committee compositions and enabling
government delegates to seek advice from the committee members on laws or policies during the
dialogue itself. 311
Fifth, we support “bring[ing] the Treaty Body system closer to the people on the
ground,” 312 by holding some committee meetings away from Geneva and within the region of the
countries under review. This would enable committee members to “engage in dialogue with people
on the local level on the ground,” 313 and increase the process’s visibility and accessibility for the
public, local media, and domestic civil society organizations unable to attend sessions in Geneva.
The OHCHR and treaty body members should proactively disseminate information on the reportand-review process and the treaty bodies’ concluding observations. Country-specific social media
campaigns to inform the broader public about the process in a constructive manner could
complement the committees’ requests to each state to disseminate widely its report and concluding
observations. Reforms aimed to promote dialogue and coordination with regional human rights
courts could further reinforce law development as well. 314
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Finally, since reporting can be so useful, it should be done more efficiently. A number of
proposals have been made to consolidate or cluster reports, to alleviate the burden of multiple
reporting requirements for both states and the treaty bodies. The Geneva Academy of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights has spearheaded these proposals, suggesting two
variations. 315 Under the first model, a state would be reviewed every seven to eight years by all
relevant treaty bodies during the same week on the basis of a single report. We advise against
institutionalizing an eight-year reporting gap, since the review process must cumulatively repeat
to affect rights practices on the ground. 316 Treaty obligations and committee recommendations
must remain salient for government officials, the media, civil society, and the broader public.
Without sustained attention, the mechanisms outlined above would be much less effective. 317
Relatedly, a single consolidated review would unnecessarily limit the attention certain issues
receive within national public discourse and hinder meaningful engagement with highly mobilized
CSOs around certain issue-specific treaties (i.e., CERD, CEDAW, CRC). Too much consolidation
in a single report-and-review process could make it harder for organizations to access the process
and garner the committees’ attention. 318
Under the second proposed model, states would be reviewed by all relevant committees
over an eight-year cycle, but clustered around two reviews by different committees at four-year
intervals. In principle, we are not opposed to temporal clustering of reviews, with one focusing on
ICCPR and ICESCR obligations and the second on issue-specific treaties. However, as with the
first proposed model, we would discourage extending the periodicity of each review cluster to
eight years.
Conversations involving periodic reporting are impactful when they go beyond
bureaucratized routines bent on satisfying a panel in Geneva and instead contribute to
domesticizing international human rights in law and practice. Much of the action must necessarily
take place outside of Geneva, in law- and policy-making settings. Criminalizing gender-based
violence, prohibiting gender discrimination in public educational systems, guaranteeing freedom
of association, and reforming prisons all depend first on implementing legislation. 319
Reviewing such legislation is beyond the scope of this Article. We recognize that
implementation has in many cases been slow, but there is some evidence that governments have
responded to higher-quality report-and-review interactions over time. Legislatures have begun—
gradually and selectively—to pass laws that address shortcomings identified by the treaty bodies.
In African countries, the reporting process has helped develop the capacity necessary to
make important legislative changes in a range of economic, social, and cultural rights of vulnerable
persons, including legislation to improve access to education and nutrition in Namibia and
progressive anti-human trafficking legislation in Algeria. Ghana, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have
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also introduced significant programs resulting from conversations with the Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 320 CEDAW has been brought into legislative debates in Latin
America relating to wage equality, decriminalizing abortion, and the minimum age for marriage. 321
In Mexico, for example, reforms of a 2007 Law of Access of Women to a Life Free From Violence
(Ley General de Accesso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia) 322 relied on CEDAW
committee recommendations. 323 Legislators in Argentina referred to CAT committee observations
to call for prison reform. 324 Of course, conversations with expert committees cannot force
implementation. But in many cases, bringing these perspectives into domestic debates emphasizes
the gravity and urgency of an issue and gives domestic actors additional persuasive leverage.
Increasingly, there is evidence that this is occurring. 325
Self-reporting systems are increasingly pervasive in international law and institutions. As
the history and development of the human rights treaty system shows, in many cases they are
considered “bare minimum” enforcement tools in areas where states are especially sensitive to
external intrusions into their sovereignty. However, we have demonstrated that treaty ratification
sets in motion an institutional process that engages states constructively. None of this occurs in a
political, social, or institutional vacuum. Persuasion, social pressure, and learning take place during
the report-and-review process.
Over time, governments develop some capacity and expertise to collect and analyze
information, detect violations, and deal with them in their domestic settings. Civil society
organizations offer additional and sometimes contradictory information, mobilize around the
reporting process, and articulate demands for change. Regional courts have increasingly looked to
the expert committees’ concluding observations to support their judgments. The reporting system
therefore has the potential to reverberate in domestic and regional politics, policy, and law and
thereby improve the realization of human rights on the ground.
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